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Intergenerational Income Mobility in Urban China

Introduction
Economists have long been interested in the issue of intergenerational mobility.
Estimating the relationship between the permanent incomes of parents and children is a critical component of a society's income dynamics. A growing body of research has demonstrated large and systematic differences across nations, with parental income being a major determinant of children's incomes in some countries, and much less important in others. To date, much of the existing research on intergenerational mobility has focused on developed nations. While this has the advantage that data sources are generally more reliable, developed nations also tend to be politically stable and to have experienced modest rates of growth.
By contrast, the growth experience of China over the past three decades has been nothing short of unprecedented. As the world's most populous nation, Chinese living standards have risen six-fold since 1979. These rapid economic changes have also been accompanied by dramatic social transformations. All this makes China a unique case study through which to better understand the relationship between societal change and income mobility.
In traditional Chinese society (prior to 1949), most social welfare was familial.
There was a strong reciprocal relationship between parents and children. Parents normally invested a large proportion of their income and assets in their offspring's education and career development (and the parental social network played an important role in children's access to education and the labour market). Children typically lived with their parents until marriage (and in many cases, after marriage as well). In return, parents expected their children to support them in old age.
During the Maoist era , social welfare was universally provided in urban areas, with the aim of making Chinese society more egalitarian. By and large, this successfully compressed the distribution of income and wealth over the Maoist period (Meng 2004 (Meng , 2007 Benjamin, Brandt, Giles and Wang, 2005) . In addition, the early socialist revolution attempted to weaken the social ties between parental and children's 1 occupations by making it impossible for children to inherit any meaningful wealth from their parents, and opening up better opportunities for education and occupational attainment for the children of poor families (Cheng and Dai 1995) . These might have facilitated an increase in intergenerational income mobility.
However, close family ties still exist and continue to deliver economic and social advantages from one generation to another. Indeed, some government policies have even decreased mobility. For instance, the policies of intergenerational job replacement (Dingti) and internal recruitment (Neizhao), which were introduced in 1977 and then were to be abolished in 1986, might have reduced the level of mobility in urban China (Yu and Liu, 2004) . 4 In addition, the unique household registration system initiated in Mao's era restricted geographic labor mobility, and therefore probably reduced intergenerational mobility (Wu and Treiman, 2003) .
5
The transition from a planned to a market oriented economy initiated in the late 1970s and early 1980s has moved the society away from the social provision of welfare back towards one that relies heavily upon individual and family responsibilities (Cai, Giles and Meng, 2006) . As a consequence, income/wealth inequality has increased sharply and family networks play an important role in job attainment, which, in turn, may have resulted in falling inter-generational income mobility. In the meantime, a steady increase in geographic mobility may have boosted intergenerational mobility across China as a whole (Wu and Treiman, 2003; Yu and Liu, 2004; Takenoshita, 2007) . 4 Yu and Liu (2004) find that since 1978, the sector, rank and size of parents' work unit have had significant effects on that their children's first job, and this effect did not attenuate even after 1986 when these two policies were abolished.
5 In Mao's era, China's unique household registration system restricted people in rural areas or small cities from accessing better opportunities in urban areas or large cities. They could only move permanently across regions by applying for permission, achieving tertiary education, getting military experience, or being recruited into a state-owned enterprise. Under the household registration system, most parents and children would locate in a same city. The intergenerational persistence in locality enhanced the intergenerational persistence in education and labor market outcomes due to systematic regional disparities in educational quality and labor markets.
6 Since China's post-1978 economic reforms, the household registration system was gradually relaxed, with permission no longer required for temporary moves across regions, and local registration no longer needed in order to acquire an informal job or to run an individual business. However, to access the jobs in the formal sector, or to permanently change their registration, people still require tertiary education, military experience or sufficient capital.
A few studies on intergenerational mobility in China appear mainly in the sociological literature. These generally focus on social stratification and political affiliation. Such studies mainly concentrate on occupational mobility and find strong intergenerational transmission in occupations and industries (Lin and Bian, 1991; Cheng and Dai 1995; Takenoshita, 2007) . In general, Communist Party members and state employees (especially government officials) have many social advantages in obtaining entrance into university, or locating better job opportunities for their children (Lin and Bian, 1991; Walder, Li and Treiman, 2000; Bian, 2002; Meng, 2007) .
The only other study on intergenerational income mobility in urban China is Guo played an important role in promoting intergenerational income mobility. However, their study uses only one income observation for parents, and one income observation for children. We aim to advance on this work by accounting for life cycle variation of income, and exploring the possible role of parental social status in determining children's outcomes.
This paper combines UHEES 2004 with repeated cross-sectional datasets covering nearly 20 years. To preview our results, we find a much higher intergenerational income elasticity than the previous estimates by Guo and Min (2008) . After accounting for fluctuations in parents' incomes and life cycle variation in children's incomes, we estimate that the intergenerational elasticity in urban China is around 0.74 for father-son, 0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter. This is an extremely high level of intergenerational persistence, and implies that intergenerational mobility is much lower in China than in most developed nations. Exploring the channels through which income is transmitted across generations, we conclude that parental education, occupation, industry, and Communist Party membership all play important roles in transmitting economic status from parents to children.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reports the methodology on how to estimate intergenerational income elasticity. Section 3 describes the data and summarizes 3 the statistics. Section 4 presents estimates of intergenerational income and earnings elasticities. Section 5 explores the main channels through which income is transmitted from parents to children. The final section concludes.
Methodology
Studies of intergenerational mobility generally estimate the association between the socioeconomic status of parents and their offspring. Becker and Tomes (1979) first suggested a log-linear intergenerational income regression to estimate the intergenerational elasticity.
where ci y is the log of children's income, pi y is the log of parents' income. The coefficient β is the intergenerational income elasticity. The larger the elasticity, the less mobility in a given society.
Ideally, intergenerational mobility calculations should estimate the elasticity of lifetime income between children and parents. 7 Using just one year's earnings/income data for parents and children can lead to a significant underestimate of the true lifetime intergenerational elasticity (Solon, 1992; Mazumder, 2005; Haider and Solon, 2006; Bohlmark and Lindquist, 2006; Dunn, 2007). 8 In order to deal with the measurement error from using one year earnings/income to proxy for lifetime earnings/income, previous studies take an average of income over a number of different years for parents in order to obtain a better estimate of permanent income (Solon, 1992; Lee and Solon, 2006; Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007 Although measurement error in the dependent variable does not in itself lead to attenuation bias, Haider and Solon (2006) point out that a attenuation bias can be caused by using log current earnings when children are in their twenties (a point at which current earnings may be quite different from average lifetime earnings). This error can be minimized by using log current earnings measured when children are aged in their thirties or forties (a point at which current earnings are close to average lifetime earnings).
To address these issues, prior researchers have controlled for the age of both children and parents, averaging parental income over multiple years, or predicting parental lifetime income by instrumenting income using parental characteristics (Reville, 1995; Dearden, Machin and Reed, 1997; Bjoklund and Jantti, 1997; Fortin and Lefebvre, 1998; Grawe, 2001; Chadwick and Solon , 2002; Mazumder, 2005; Lefranc and Trannoy, 2005; Haider and Solon, 2006; Grawe, 2006; Ferreira and Veloso, 2006; Lee and Solon, 2006, Nicoletti and Ermisch, 2007; Herz et al., 2007; Mocetti, 2007; Dunn, 2007; Leigh, 2007) . However, a key issue in the instrumental variable approach is selecting instruments that only affect children's earnings through the channel of parental earnings, and do not directly impact children's earnings (Solon, 1992) .
In addition to general issues that arise when estimating intergenerational elasticities, the specific economic environment in China over recent decades may also pose additional difficulty in estimating parental lifetime income. Due to rapid economic growth and sectoral change, the age-earnings profile and the return to particular demographic characteristics have shifted markedly. Figure 1 presents the changes in ageearnings profiles over the period [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Figure 1a depicts the log of average real annual earnings for each particular birth cohort as they age. The different lines are for different birth cohorts, starting withthose born between 1970-75 (aged 20-25 in 1995) and ending with people born between 1935-39 (aged 56-60 in 1995 Another way to illustrate the same point is to look at age-earnings profiles over time. Figure 1b The changes in the importance of age and provincial dummy variables in explaining earnings variation overtime is striking. At the beginning of the period, around one-quarter of the variation in earnings could be explained by age and its squared term alone, while at the end of the period a quadratic in age explained just 2 per cent. Similarly, the impact of provincial dummy variables doubled from about 10 percent to 20 percent between the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, before declining to its original level in the 2000s. Education, on the other hand, explained less than 3 per cent of the variation in earnings at the beginning of the period, but over 10 per cent at the end of the period.
Given the significant changes in the shape of the age-earnings profiles as well as the changing returns to demographics, it is even more problematic to assume that a single year of income can be used to proxy parents' permanent income in urban China.
In our empirical analysis, we modify equation (1) by controlling for a quadratic in children's age and a quadratic in parental age, and including indicator variables for the 16
regions that comprise our sample (see footnote 12):
where ci y is the log of the child's observed income, pi y is the log of the parent's observed A is its square). ci R is a vector of regional dummy variables capturing regional variation in prices and wages.
In our first specification, we use OLS to estimate equation (2), and restrict the age range for children and parents to an interval where current earnings are the best proxy for long-run earnings (we also experiment with varying this age range). For example, nepotism in the Chinese university admissions process might lead us to overestimate the true intergenerational income elasticity if we instrument using parental education. Similarly, nepotism in the Chinese job market might lead us to overestimate the true intergenerational income elasticity if we instrument using parental occupation.
Our third approach, following Arellano and Meghir (1992), Angrist and Krueger (1992) , Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) , Mocetti (2007) , and Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007) is to adopt the method of two-sample two-stage-least-squares (TS2SLS). To implement this, we use the cross sectional survey (UHEES 2004) containing information on both children's and parents' current income, education, and demographics. We then combine this with repeated cross-sectional data covering a two-decade period, and include information about parental pseudo-cohorts' earnings, education, occupation, and actual 9 Although we are guided in this analysis by the work of Haider and Solon (2006), their empirical analysis uses U.S. data, and therefore considers an economy with a relatively stable wage growth and age-earnings profile. The situation for China is different. As indicated in Figure 1a , over time the age-earnings profile has changed markedly, with 30-45 year olds experiencing more rapid wage increases than other age groups. 10 To test sensitivity of the instrument we also use parental occupation and industry of employment as instruments to predict their permanent income.
labour market experience. We predict parental permanent income using the latter data source, hoping that it will allow us to better proxy parental permanent income over a period of significant income changes.
To be precise, we use the repeated cross-section sample to estimate the following equation separately for each gender and year over the period 1986-2004:
where it y is the log of observed real income (deflated by province-specific price indices)
for individuals who are of working age (men aged 16 to 60 and women aged 16 to 55) and working in year t, X i is a vector of individual characteristics including years of schooling, actual age and its square term in year t, while it ov Pr is a vector of provincial dummies. Since the second stage equation also includes parental age and a vector of provincial dummies, the excluded instrument is parental education. We also repeat the same exercise using occupation and industry of employment as the instruments.
Based on the estimated coefficients from Equation (3) In addition to the benefit of better capturing parental permanent income, this method also significantly increases the number of observations with both children and parental incomes. However, this method does not avoid the problem of violating the exclusion restriction. Hence, when interpreting the results we should bear this in mind.
11 The age of the parents for the year t-n for the prediction is calculated by (
). Because we have information from the parent-child dataset (UHEES 2004) on the exact year in which parents started work and retired, we are able to predict parental income in each of the 19 years for those who were working at the time. For parents who started the first job or retired during the 1986-2004 period, their predicted income is set to missing for the period before they started working or after they retired. 
Data and Summary Statistics
The data used for this study are from two sources: the Urban Household 14 The survey data can be reorganized into child-parent pairs, where each pair includes individual information for children and parents. There are two different kinds of children in the sample. Some are children residing in their parents' home where a parent is the household head (we call these the 'parent-headed sample'). Another group are children residing in their own home (we call these the 'child-headed sample').
These samples are found to have a different age distribution, with both children and parents being much younger in the parent-headed sample than in the child-headed 12 The UHIES is a nationwide survey (31 provinces) but due to confidentiality restrictions, we have access to data for only 16 provinces. There are 12 provinces included in the UHEES survey (Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Gansu). When using UHIES to estimate earnings equations as a base for predicted parental earnings, we use data for all 16 provinces we have access to (not just the 12 in the UHEES). 13 However, non-residing children of the household head and spouse are not surveyed. 14 For detailed description of the UHIES data, see Meng, Gong, and Wang, 2009. sample (see Figure 3) . We hope that combining the two samples will give us a sample of parents and children who are reasonably representative of the general population. The summary statistics of children's and parents' ages, years of education, income, and earnings are reported in Table 1 . 18 The top panel reports all child-parent pairs in our UHEES sample, while the lower panel reports the sample in which both children and parents are working in 2004. Below we only discuss in detail the bottom panel results.
Children are between 17 and 41 years old, fathers between 39 and 60 and mothers between 37 and 55. The average age is about 26 for children, 54 for fathers and 50 for mothers. Slightly more than half of the sample children are males. The average number of years of schooling is about 13.5 for children and 10 for parents. The table also shows that (conditional on working) fathers have the highest income and earnings on average, followed by children and then mothers.
15 This is because when using UHIES data to predict for parental earnings, we restrict for each year that father's and mother's age should be no older than 60 and 55, respectively, they should have at least 5 years of predicted earnings to be included in the sample. The earliest data we have for UHIES is 1986 and to have at least 5 years of predicted earnings the parents have to be no older than 60 or 55 in 1990 (no older than 74 and 69 in 2004) . 16 This is the sample used in Table 3A . Summing across the four combinations (father-son, father-daughter, mother-son, mother-daughter), the sample size is 2813+2662+1734+1697=8906. 17 This is the sample used in Table 2 . Summing across the four combinations (father-son, father-daughter mother-son, , mother-daughter), the sample size is 646+313+592+262=1813. 18 The incomes in this study are in 2004 prices, based on provincial urban CPI indices.
Estimated Intergenerational Income Elasticity
The intergenerational income elasticity is estimated using Equation (2) The bottom panel of Table 2 presents the results using one cross-sectional survey (the 2004 UHEES), but instrumenting income using parental demographics. The estimated elasticities increase somewhat, but the general pattern does not change much.
Again, given that the sample size in the mother-son and mother-daughter samples is extremely small, so we do not place much weight on these estimated intergenerational elasticities.
We then move to use predicted parental income from the UHIES data to estimate Equation (2). Before we do so, we report some basic statistics of the predictions of the 
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On average fathers' permanent incomes are predicted using 13 years of data, while mothers' permanent incomes are predicted using 12 years of past income data. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of years' income used in this analysis.
Only 5 per cent of the sample have 5 or fewer years of data, while many have 10 years or more. These data should give us a fairly good measure of the permanent income. As indicated in Mazumder (2005) more years of data eliminates the downward bias due to persistent transitory shocks and corrects for the age-related errors-in-variables bias. In addition, as discussed in Section 2 there have been significant changes in the earnings levels and earnings determination mechanism. Using average predicted earnings from repeated cross-sectional data for the past 20 years will help us account for the non-linear impact of these changes in earnings, thereby helping to reduce errors-in-variables bias.
We then examine the relationship between parental predicted permanent incomes and their reported income in 2004 for a group of parents who were working in 2004 and had positive income. Figure 5 shows a strong positive relationship between current and predicted permanent income (the correlation coefficient is 0.46 for fathers and 0.55 for mothers). In Figure 6 , we plot the difference between the current income and predicted permanent income for both mothers and fathers and find only a modest difference between their current and permanent incomes. For both fathers and mothers, the standard deviation of the difference is about 0.6, suggesting that for two-thirds of respondents, the difference between their permanent and current incomes is less than 60 log points (about 80 percent). This is a larger gap than one would expect to observe in a developed nation, but as we have noted, the rapid changes in the Chinese labor market over recent decades have had quite differential impacts across the working-age population.
Having examined the reliability of the predicted permanent income data for parents, we use these data to estimate Equation (2) and report the results in Table 3 .
Columns 1 to 4 in panels A and B of Table 3 show father-child and mother-child intergenerational income elasticities for different age groups of children, while column 5 restricts the sample to individuals whose fathers were working in 2004. Thus, the permanent income elasticities reported in column 5 are essentially comparable to the current income elasticities reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 ).
For father-daughter pairs, the increase in elasticity when using fathers' permanent income relative to using fathers' reported income is almost the same as for the father-son pairs. For mother-son and mother-daughter pairs, the increase in estimated elasticities from using mothers' permanent income is not as large as for father-son and fatherdaughter pairs, but the general pattern is consistent.
Our preferred specification restricts the sample to children aged 30-42 (to account for lifecycle bias), and uses parental predicted permanent income. The estimated elasticities in this specification are 0.74 for father-son, 0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter.
The above results use predicted parental permanent income with education as the instrument. We also estimated the same regressions using predicted parental permanent income with occupation and industry as the instruments. The results are presented in 19 The sample sizes in columns 1 and 4 of Table 2 are slightly smaller than those shown in column 5 of Table 3A , since there are a handful of parents who are working but for whom we do not observe incomes. Dropping these cases makes no substantive difference to the comparison -the elasticity is much higher when we use permanent parental incomes (Table 3A) than when we use one-year parental incomes (Table  2) . 20 In practice, the age range of the sample that uses current father's income (Table 2 , column 3, third row) is 30-39. However, if we place the same age restriction on the sample that uses permanent father's income (Table 3A , column 4), we obtain results very similar to those reported in Table 3A .
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Appendix A.
Using occupation and industry as instruments the estimated intergenerational elasticities are lower than using education (but still much higher than those using current parental income). In attempting to see what explains the difference, we found that the unconditional correlation between child income and parental income is very similar using either instrument set (see Appendix B for the comparison of the unconditional relationships). Only when we introduce regional dummy variables into the regression do the estimates diverge. Our conjecture is that perhaps within a particular region there is more income variation across education levels than across occupation/industry groups. Thus, within a particular region the predicted income using education has more variation than predicted income using occupation and industry.
We also estimated the elasticity of children's incomes with respect to their parents' combined incomes. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 3 . In this specification, the sample is restricted to children whose father works (and thus the sample size is the same as for the father estimates in Table 3A ). Note that in the case of two- 
How Is Income Earning Ability Transmitted Across Generations?
In this section, we analyze how income earning ability is transferred across generations in urban China, focusing particularly on the role of education, party membership, occupation and industry.
Education is believed to be a significant pathway of intergenerational transmission for many countries. 22 Using our full sample, we therefore estimate intergenerational educational transmission by both schooling years and by categories of educational attainment: (1) lower secondary schooling or less; (2) upper secondary schooling; (3) college and above. 21 There are too few studies of father-daughter, mother-son, and mother-daughter elasticities to draw strong conclusions about how our results compare with those for other countries. However, given that these elasticities tend to be highly correlated within countries, it seems reasonable to conclude that urban China is relatively socially immobile for women as well as men. 22 For instance, when education is not subsidized, rich parents can invest more in their children's education than poor parents. Subsidized education can be a way of equalizing opportunities for poor children (Eide and Showalter, 1999; Ng, 2007) . Measured in years of schooling rather than categorically, the correlation coefficient between parents' and children's education ranges from 0.22 for mothers and sons to 0.38 for mothers and daughters (see the bottom panel of Table 4 whether the attitudes and norms of family ties differ between rich and poor parents; and whether cohabitation with parents strengthens intergenerational persistence through the effects on beliefs and preferences (Mocetti, 2007) . Table 5 reports the persistence matrices of Communist Party membership, occupation, and sector of employment between children and parents by gender using the total sample. The first panel of Table 5 shows that if the parents are party members, their children are between 4 and 10 percentage points more likely to be party members (for sons, this represents about a 10-20 percent increase in the probability of joining the party, while for daughters it represents a more than 50 percent increase in the probability of party membership). The second panel indicates a very strong persistence in occupation between children and parents. If fathers or mothers are working in the occupation "professionals and technicians", their children are 35-40 percentage points more likely to also be working in this occupation than those whose parents are not (this represents a near-tripling in the probability of being in this occupational category). The differences for "administration staff" are 17-23 percentage points (approximately a doubling in the probability), while for "production and transportation workers" the differences are 16-30
percentage points (having a father who was a production worker approximately triples the probability that a child will enter this occupational grouping, while having a mother who was a production worker doubles the probability).
The third panel of Table 5 presents the proportions of sons and daughters working in the state-owned sector based on whether their fathers and mothers also work in that sector. Seventy-one percent of sons and 67 percent of daughters work in the state-owned sector. Children are 6-9 percentage points (about 10 percent) more likely to work in the state-owned sector if one of their parents also worked in that sector.
Conclusions
An old Chinese saying holds that families will "be poor no more than three generations and be rich no more than three generations". 23 This suggests that in China, as in many nations, there is a strong popular belief in social mobility. Our findings challenge this view. At least for modern-day urban China, we find a strikingly low level of intergenerational mobility. Our preferred estimates show that the intergenerational income elasticities are 0.74 for father-son, 0.84 for father-daughter, 0.33 for mother-son, and 0.47 for mother-daughter. Internationally, our estimated father-son elasticity places urban China among the least socially mobile places in the world.
Empirically, our analysis shows the importance of obtaining a measure of permanent income, and accounting for lifecycle bias. If we use single-year income measures for parents, we obtain substantially lower estimates of the intergenerational income elasticity for China (indeed, such estimates imply that urban China is an extremely socially mobile place). However, when we use predicted permanent incomes, and restrict the sample of children to those aged 30-42 (to account for lifecycle bias), we obtain intergenerational elasticities that are sometimes twice as large.
Note that we do not formally calculate intergenerational correlations for urban China, since doing so would require information on the underlying variance in permanent incomes (recall that we predict parental income using parental demographics). However,
given that income inequality in urban China (measured by annual incomes) has risen markedly over recent decades, it is likely that inequality of permanent incomes has also risen. The intergenerational correlation (ρ) is simply equal to the elasticity (β), multiplied by the ratio of the standard deviation of log income in the parents' generation (σ p ) and the children's generation (σ c ), i.e. However, even taking this into account, China's intergenerational correlation is likely to be higher than that observed for most developed nations.
Another factor to bear in mind is that our study focuses only on urban China.
Given the large income differences between rural and urban China, it is likely that intergenerational mobility is higher for individuals born in rural parts of the country, and therefore that the intergenerational elasticity of income (or earnings) for the entire country is likely to be lower than that which we estimate for urban China. However, from a policy perspective, our estimated elasticity is still an important parameter. Although rural-urban migration offers the potential for upwards social mobility for those born in rural areas, it only offers the potential for downwards social mobility for those born in urban areas.
Exploring possible pathways, we find that education, especially college study, is one channel through which earnings ability is transmitted from parents to children (though the intergenerational association of education is still lower in urban China than in many other nations). We also find intergenerational correlations for parental party membership, occupation, and industry. The occupational correlation is particularly high, suggesting that occupation may be the most important channel through which intergenerational transmission occurs in urban China. However, it is also possible that factors we do not perfectly observe in our data -such as genes, health, or social networks -are also significant explanators of intergenerational transmission in urban China. in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Father's income and mother's income are single-year incomes (measured in 2004) . Each elasticity is from a separate regression. R-squared statistics are reported for OLS, but not for IV (since the latter is not a particularly meaningful statistic). 
